

FROM MISCELLANEOUS—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
(C).....	329	12/20	No request to report to Department of Proctor Law Office (Re: Japanese NONSTOPPER at the Tokyo Motor Ambulance)	To the CG 100, to the TS 100.
(C).....	331	12/21	No request to report to Department of Proctor Law Office, at USA, Tokyo	To the CG 100, to the TS 100.
(X).....	488	12/21	No request to report to Department of Proctor Law Office, at USA, Tokyo	To the CG 100, to the TS 100.
	485	12/21	No request to report to Department of Proctor Law Office, at USA, Tokyo	To the CG 100.
0001A1.....	716	11/7	No request to report to Department of Proctor Law Office, at USA, Tokyo	To the CG 100.
(C).....	741	11/7	No request to report to Department of Proctor Law Office, at USA, Tokyo	To the CG 100, to the TS 100.
(C).....	747	11/7	No request to report to Department of Proctor Law Office, at USA, Tokyo	To the CG 100, to the TS 100.
(1).....	754	11/7	No request to report to Department of Proctor Law Office, at USA, Tokyo	To the CG 100.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 63

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-30C1-AJ (SC) N20-12.
Serial 09330.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, Feb. 15, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations

To: The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl Harbor.

1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.

2. Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in planning the installation of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which the following may be considered:

(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. One hundred and fifty feet of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.

(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side most difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking

planes to come within effective range of anti-aircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection, balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of naturally well protected anchorages within a harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a fleet is based, the installation of satisfactory baffles will be difficult because of the congestion.

3. As a matter of interest the successful attacks at Taranto were made at very low launching heights at reported ranges by the individual aviators of 400 to 1300 yards from the battleships, but the *depths of water* in which the torpedoes were launched were *between 14 and 15 fathoms*. The attacks were made in the face of intensive and apparently erratic anti-aircraft fire. The eastern shore line of the anchorage and moorings were protected by numerous balloon barrages, but there was no trawler borne balloon barrage to the west. The torpedoes were apparently dropped inside of the nets, probably A/T nets.

4. It is considered that certain large bays and harbors, where a fleet or large force of heavy ships may be anchored and exposed with a large body of water on an entire flank, should have that flank protected by a series of baffles if the water is deep enough for launching torpedoes. The main fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow, for instance, has an A/T net extending slightly to the north of a line between Calf of Flotta and Cava Island protecting the main fleet anchorage. The depth of water where this net is laid in approximately 17 fathoms. On the other hand constricted harbors, in which practically all available space is taken up by anchorages, and which is relatively deep probably must depend upon other defense measures. It might be possible and practicable to provide in some places, which are not protected by relatively shallow water, anti-torpedo baffles practically surrounding a limited number of berths for large ships, such as battleships or carriers. An extreme example of this is furnished at the present time by the French at Dakar, where double nets surround the Richelieu; she is placed similarly as in a dry dock, and evidently would have to open a section of the net to be hauled clear. The depth of water at Dakar, however, is very shallow.

5. The present A/T nets are very expensive, extremely heavy, their heavy anchors and moorings take up about 200 yards of space perpendicular to the line of the net, take a long time to lay, and are designed to stand up under heavy weather conditions. There is apparently a great need for the development of a light efficient torpedo net which could be laid temporarily and quickly within protected harbors and which can be readily removed. It is hoped that some such net can be developed in the near future.

6. Recommendations and comments of the Commander-in-Chief are especially desired.

H. R. STARK.

Copy to: CinC Atlantic Fleet
CinC Asiatic Fleet

CinC File No.
381-5/0398

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
At Sea, Hawaiian Area, March 12, 1941.

Confidential

From: Command-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl Harbor.

Reference: (a) CNC Conf. ltr. file Op-30C1-AJ (SC) N20-12 Serial 09330 of 15 Feb. 1941.

1. In view of the contents of reference (a), the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, recommends that until a light efficient net, that can be laid temporarily and quickly is developed, no A/T nets be supplied this area.

H. E. KIMMEL.

C-N20-12/ND14

20 MARCH 1941

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.

Reference: (a) CNO Classified ltr serial 010230 of February 17, 1941.

1. In reply to reference (a) the following comment and recommendation on anti-torpedo baffles for vessels moored in Pearl Harbor is submitted.

(a) The depth of water in and alongside available berths in Pearl Harbor does not exceed forty-five (45) feet.

(b) There is limited maneuvering area in Pearl Harbor for vessels approaching and leaving berths which prevents the departure of a large group of vessels on short notice.

(c) Most of the available berths are located close aboard the main ship channels, which are crossed by cable and pipe lines as well as ferry routes. The installation of baffles for the fleet moorings would have to be so extensive that most of the entire channel area would be restricted.

2. Other harbors in the Fourteenth Naval District have a water depth limitation similar to Pearl Harbor.

3. In view of the foregoing the Commandant does not recommend the installation of baffles for moorings in Pearl Harbor or other harbors in the Fourteenth Naval District.

C. C. BLOCH.

cc: to
CINCPACIFIC
BUORD

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Washington, June 13, 1945.

Op-30C1-AJ
(SC)N20-12
Serial 055730
Confidential

From: The Chief of Naval Operations

To: The Commandant, First Naval District
The Commandant, Third Naval District
The Commandant, Fourth Naval District
The Commandant, Fifth Naval District
The Commandant, Sixth Naval District
The Commandant, Seventh Naval District
The Commandant, Eighth Naval District
The Commandant, Tenth Naval District
The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District
The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District
The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.

Reference: (a) CNO conf. ltr. Op-30C1 Serial 010230 of Feb. 17, 1941.

1. In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was stated:

"A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered."

2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it can not be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.

4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms.

R. E. INGERSOLL.

Copy to: CinCpac
CinClant
CinCaf
C. O. Naval Net Depot, Tiburon
C. O. Naval Net Depot, Newport
Comdt. NavSta, Guantanamo
Comdt. NavSta, Samoa
BuOrd
Op-12

A16/ND14/(16)

Serial 086W

Secret

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Subject: Blocking Pearl Harbor Channel.

Reference: (a) Com-14 Conf. ltr. C-A16/H3/ND14(0800) of August 16, 1941.

1. In view of anti-submarine defenses approved for and now in process of installation at Honolulu and Pearl Harbor, the Commander-in-Chief does not desire to reopen the question of anti-submarine nets thereat.

2. With reference to laying defensive mine fields off those harbors, it is believed there is insufficient prospect of commensurate return for the restricted maneuverability and risks involved to our own ships.

3. The Commander-in-Chief has noted with approval the action initiated toward obtaining suitable radar for protection of channel entrance. He would like to see this matter vigorously prosecuted. Please keep him informed as to progress.

4. WPL-46 assigns salvage in these waters as a task for the forces afloat, assisted by such facilities as the shore establishment may be able to provide. Organization and assembly of equipment is now in process under Commander Base Force. It is requested that the results of the study and inventory referred to in paragraph (3) of reference (a) be made available to Commander Base Force and that, if and when necessity arises, appropriate local facilities and technical facilities be furnished him.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 64

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington, Feb. 7, 1941.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

1. In replying to your letter of January 21, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight patrol planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six patrol planes; nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 patrol planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring